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BOOK REVIEW

THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Richard Lillich. Manchester, United King-

dom:

Manchester University Press, 1984.

Pp. 1, 177.

$38.00.
Professor Lillich's recent book, The Human Rights of
Aliens in Contemporary International Law (hereinafter Human
Rights of Aliens), presents an exciting vision of developing
human rights for noncitizens. Traditionally, aliens had to
rely on their state of nationality to protect their rights. If the
state chose not to intercede, the alien was left without remedy. Lillich proposes that there have been substantial
changes in the way aliens' rights are protected; international
legal protections now allow redress for individual aliens independent of state efforts.
Lillich's thesis is that a new body of international law
bearing on the rights of individual aliens can be created by
piecing together various sources. Once assembled, this "juridical puzzle" 1 represents a breakthrough in international
law because it reveals new methods by which some aliens can
protect their individual rights without having to rely on their
home state's intervention. Moreover, Lillich asserts that
states' traditional freedom over aliens has gradually begun to
erode. 2 In support of his argument, Lillich marshalls many
international agreements and reviews various state practices
1. R. LILLICH, THE HuzAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNAnONAL LAw 2-3 (1984).
2. In Lillich's words, the "logic of the traditional international law system protecting the rights of aliens exclusively (if at all) through the medium of the nation-State must give way in contemporary international
law-and, in fact, has already begun to do so-to the direct protection of
the rights of individual aliens as such." Id. at 2. According to the author,
"what the international community is witnessing today is a major change-the significance of which cannot be overstated-in the way in which the

rights of aliens are protected." The change, furthermore, is not "mere[ly]
procedural" but "involves a serious restriction-though . . . a much
needed one-on the broad autonomy which States have traditionally enjoyed in their dealings with aliens." Id. at 3.
479
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pertaining to aliens. But a close examination of the evidence
in Human Rights of Aliens more readily suggests the opposite
conclusion: states remain the arbiters for defining and protecting individual rights even as they expand protections for
aliens.
While Lillich's optimism is appealing and his scholarship is impressive, Human Rights of Aliens raises false hopes.
The book's thesis, like that of much current human rights
literature 3 and advocacy, 4 overstates its claim to a basis in
international law. The book, however, presents an opportunity to reexamine debates between positivists and naturalists
that continue to enliven human rights discussions. 5 Naturalist models of international human rights law dominate the
stage at this time; that they are superior is by no means a
foregone conclusion.6 This book inadvertently supports a
3. For a listing and critique of some currently advocated human
rights, see Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposalfor Quality
Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1984).
4. Few current human rights works take the time to rigorously analyze
how sources of international law affirm the existence of particular rights.
In some cases, a right will be described as part of "soft law" when it appears in documents of international organizations that do not have a binding effect. See M. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES
(1985). Fewer works acknowledge the differences of opinion among
scholars regarding how sources of international law are identified and applied. For different interpretations of how to identify customary interna-

tional law, see A.

D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1971) and Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 1974-1975

BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 17. For a critique of Akehurst's critique, see D'Amato,
The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110,
1135-44 (1982). On the relationship between treaties and custom see generally M. VILLIGER, supra, at 34-6; Baxter, Multilqteral Treaties as Evidence of
Customary InternationalLaw, 1966 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275; Baxter, Treaties
and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 25 (1970).
5. Classic examples of this debate in a non-international law context
are found in Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593 (1958) and Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). In the international law context,
a summary of the debate can be found in M. Bos, A METHODOLOGY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-35 (1984). Bos not only analyzes the natural and
positive paradigms of international law but also rejects them in favor of a
third model of international law.
6. See Sinha, Freeing Human Rightsfrom National Rights, 70 ARdCIv FOR
REGHTS-UND SOZIAL PHILOSOPHIE 342 (1984).
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positivist framework to analyze and advance human rights
law.
Understanding this book requires a basic knowledge of
the distinctions between positivist and naturalist conceptions
of international law. 7 Professor Lillich's model of the international legal world adheres to a naturalist conception. According to this view, assembling the "international law" of
aliens is considered a matter of "revealing" rather than "creating" international law.8 The naturalist jurist "finds the
law," which corresponds to notions of what is moral. Consequently, advances in alien protection are considered results
of an inexorable process in which the rights of states must
"give way" to the rights of individuals. 9
While Lillich's normative emphasis simply assumes that
a consensus about international law exists, debate still rages
about the legal effect of some international and regional instruments' o and the identification of customary international
law. In Lillich's view, states unwittingly set off processes that
lead to the creation of law that binds all states. This model
of international law demonstrates an impatience with the
"Westphalian" framework, the scheme of law deriving its
powers and legitimacy solely from the consent of states'.
7. On the distinction between legal positivism and naturalism, see L
LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TOJURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1972). For a summary of

the distinctions between the two theories, see Note, Dualistic Legal Phenomena and the Limitations of Positivism, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 823, 824-25 (1986).
On their distinction in international law, see Gross, Family Planning as a
Human Right: SomeJurisprudentialReflections on NaturalRights andPositive Law,
in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGOANizAnoN 227-31 (L. Gross ed.
1984).
8. R. LiLLICH, supra note 1, at 3.
9. See sources cited supra note 5.
10. See, e.g., Sohn & Buergenthal, Note on the Legal Effect of the Universal
Declaration, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HubAN RiGors 518-22
(1973); see also supra note 4.
11. For seminal description of the Westphalian legal order, see Gross,
The Peace of Westphalia: 1648-1948, 42 AM.J. INT'L L. 20 (1948). For further discussion of consent's role in international law, see Simma. Consent:
Strains in the Treaty System, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INFERNATIoNAL LAW 485 (R. MacDonald & D. Johnston eds. 1983); 0. SCHACTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: GENERAL COURSE IN PUBuC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-39 (1985). For other examples of impatience with

the Westphalian legal order, seeJanis, Individualsas Subjects of International
Law, 17 CORNELL INTL' L.J. 61 (1984) and Sohn, The New InternationalLaw:
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Contrary to naturalists, positivists have a more restric-

tive view of international law, for they insist that international law arises from those bodies endowed by states with
law-creating powers, or state actions intended to have legal
effect. 12 Where state consent is absent, the positivist

predicts the law will be ineffective.' 3 Under a positivist analysis, what is "right" is not necessarily embodied in law. The

tension between the two positions is often stated as the dif-

ference between "is" and "ought." It is the difference between description and prescription.

State treatment of aliens was and remains a sovereign's
perogative. Even in the post-colonial world, states remain
convinced that only territorial jurisdiction should be the basis for the rules governing behavior toward those persons located within their borders. And where states have effectively
conceded their sovereignty, as in Europe, it is through
treaty, the touchstone of positive law.' 4 Even treaties based
on naturalist norms constitute the basis of positivist international analysis because they unambiguously represent legal
obligations undertaken by state consent. Apart from treaty
law, assertions of customary law protection for aliens remain
5

weak.

1

Lillich's approach implies that the international law reProtection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1
(1982).
12. Consensual state practices that demonstrate a legal intent include
diplomatic correspondences, actions accompanied by an articulated legal
rationale, and entrance into agreements which are intended to have legal
effect. For a critique of naturalist human rights law-making that ignores
the role of consent in international law, see Hassan, A Conflict of Philosophies: The FilartigaJurisprudence,32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 250 (1983).
13. See Gross, The United Nations and the Role of Law, 19 INT'L ORG. 537,
558 (1965); see also Gross, supra note 11.
14. On the ability of a state to compromise its sovereignty through
treaty, see Austro-German Customs Union Case (Aus. v. Ger.), 1931
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41, briefed in H. BRIGGS, THE LAw OF NATIONS 72-74
(2d ed. 1952).
15. These assertions remain weak even in a regional context. On the
lack of regional customary law, see Asylum Case, 1950 I.CJ. 266,. digested
in N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
836-40 (1973). Where states in a region are signatories to a treaty, local
non-signatory states are not bound. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(Den. v. W. Ger.; Neth. v. W. Ger.), 1969 I.CJ. 118, digested in 63 AM. J.
INT'L

L. 591-636 (1969).
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garding aliens has progressed gradually, with the greatest
advancement following World War II. He assumes that a
consensus concerning the legal status of aliens has recently
emerged in the international community. His historical approach fails for two reasons. First, the detailed historical
overview surveys economic and civil rights in the pre-World
War I period, but confines its post-World War I review only
to civil rights. Yet economic and civil rights for aliens are
rarely neatly separable or inapposite. 16 Lillich, however, admits that traditional doctrines of protection of aliens are not
his primary concern; nor does he claim that his book is an
exhaustive review of past or contemporary law regarding
protection of aliens. 17 Nevertheless, he provides an excellent overview of how, through several epochs, concerns for
the protection of aliens were manifested in legal doctrines
and state behavior.
The book examines the pre-twentieth century forms and
doctrines of legal protections for aliens. Among the legal
devices and doctrines discussed are the legal arsenals of colonialists, merchants, and host countries, which include concessions, diplomatic protection, minimum standards arguments versus national treatment, the Calvo doctrine, capitu-

lations, and Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties.
The second analytical flaw is that past and current state
practices regarding aliens are not as disjointed as the book
would have its readers believe. Contemporary discussions
concerning alien rights often mirror previous state behavior.
Yet the book's extensive historical overview nowhere integrates past lessons with current attempts to protect aliens.
Numerous current debates can be linked to early attempts to shield national decisions from international or
"civilized" standards. Lillich eschews historical parallels
even though they contain continuing lessons of how states
protect sovereign rights in their treatment of aliens. The
seeds of many contemporary debates lie in the historical
materials Lillich presents, but he never links current
problems to the law on protection of aliens that developed
over a four hundred year period due to the rapid growth of
16. Restrictions on work or holding of property nullifies the value of

most other rights.
17. R. LILLICH, supra note I, at 3.
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international commerce. By failing to connect the past to the
present, current developments regarding aliens appear sui
generis.

For instance, early disagreements by states over national
standards for treating aliens, as opposed to minimum international standards, are still far from resolution, with the issue currently taking on North-South dimensions."' If the
United States and Mexico could not resolve the minimum
standards versus national treatment problem, there is little
reason to believe that other states are better equipped to resolve this issue or that the new law of aliens provides a solution. Unfortunately, these sorts of links are ignored even
though they contain valuable lessons in how states act to
protect sovereignty rights in their treatment of aliens. However, Lillich does note that the United Nations' silence about
Nigeria's expulsion of Ghanaians' 9 indicates that most states
refuse to acknowledge the existence of alien rights under international law.
In addition, information regarding refugees and population transfers is a prime area for analysis that Lillich addresses only cursorily. Pre-World War II developments concerning refugees resulted from political change. New
problems and new alignments gave rise to legal innovations
regarding aliens. The period between the two World Wars
saw mass exchanges of populations. Treaties, motivated by
self-interest, helped solve the problem of dislocated persons.
The treaties that developed to accommodate exchanges of
populations and transfers of labor in the periods between
the World Wars will interest any student of migration or refugee law. How and why states were able to cooperate in the
orderly transfer of populations is not analyzed, even though
the issue resurfaces when Lillich discusses the protections
now offered by France to Algerian workers. Some parallels
could have been drawn here to the treaties France entered
into with Poland 20 and with Czechoslovakia, 21 the first trea18. Lillich acknowleges that "[t]he debate between these two schools of
international law is as lively as it has ever been." R. LILLICH, supra note 1,
at 17.
19. Id. at 4 n.6.
20. Convention Between France and Poland Respecting Reciprocal
Emigration, Sept. 3, 1919, 1 L.N.T.S. 337.
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ties dealing with migrant workers.
The ingenuity and readiness of states to create effective
international agreements concerned with particular types of
aliens points to another weakness in the book, namely its failure to distinguish among types of aliens. All aliens are not
similarly situated, and states' willingness to compromise
their sovereignty to afford aliens protections may depend on
the type of alien and the particular state interest involved.
For example, one of the most effective systems for protecting

aliens is the international refugee system. Why this system
works and why its Convention 22 and Protoco 23 have gained
adherents is a basic issue not addressed in the book's historical overview.
In his discussion of the United Nations, Lillich moves
from a broad historical discussion of the law concerning protection of aliens, with its primarily economic motivations, to
a textual analysis of U.N. instruments. The U.N. Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two Covenants on Human Rights, although considered to have the
customary international law status, offer little protection to
aliens. Lillich also notes that the International Law Commission (hereinafter the ILC) failed to deal with the problem of
the treatment of aliens.2 4 The ILC distinguishes the general
law of state responsibility from the law of state responsibility
for injuries to aliens.25 By not codifying the law governing
the treatment of aliens, the ILC placed the burden of advancing aliens' rights on various U.N. bodies.
Uganda's expulsion of Asians in 1972 finally catalyzed
U.N. organs to take action on the issue of alien protection.
The Elles Draft Declaration,2 6 acknowledging that many of
21. Convention Between France and Czechoslovakia Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, Mar. 20, 1920, 3 L.N.T.S. 139.

22. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in R. LLICH, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTs INSTRUMENTS 180.1-.30 (1983).
23. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606

U.N.T.S. 267, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 22, at 110.1-.7.
24. Lillich makes a number of trenchant comments on the ILC's handling of the treatment of aliens and concludes that the current draft articles that ILC members "have produced and continue to produce" are so
abstract as to border on the ethereal. R. LILLICH, supra note I, at 50.
25. Id.

26. According to Lillich, the United Nations response to the expulsion
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the aliens' problems are unique, expressed certain international minimum protection for aliens. Regrettably, the protective standard in the Elles Draft has no legal status. Moreover, the subject of alien rights has become an extremely
delicate topic in the United Nations; in fact, for a few years
the term "non-citizens" replaced "aliens" to avoid political
sensitivities. 27 Analysis of these sensitivities indirectly indicates what fears would have to be allayed before the Elles
Draft could become a document that states would be willing
to sign and ratify, as they generally have been with the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol concerned with refugee protections.
Lillich's treatment of multilateral instruments protecting
refugees and stateless persons is brief and adds little to an
already voluminous literature.2 8 It does contribute, however, to the current analysis on the problem of alien protection in the treatment of migrant workers by including a brief
discussion on the Draft United Nations Migrant Workers
Convention. Lillich concludes that the Draft has a fatal flaw:
its overbreadth renders it useless.
By conceding that international efforts to protect aliens
are generally ineffective, 29 Lillich undercuts the thesis of
Human Rights of Aliens. He acknowledges that states continue
to believe that territorial jurisdiction dictates how a state
was limited to a discussion by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on whether to send a "deferentially worded telegram of remonstrance to President Amin." Id. at 51.
The telegram was never sent. The Sub-Commission did muster the courage, however, to adopt a resolution recommending that the Commission
on Human Rights (hereinafter CHR), its parent body, consider the applicability of international human rights instruments to aliens and the desirability of further measures. In 1973, the CHR requested the Economic and
Social Council, its parent body, to return the matter to the Sub-Commission to study what steps should be undertaken. The matter was returned,
and Baroness Elles of Great Britain ensured preparation of reports on the
matter. The resulting reports concluded that existing human rights instruments do not adequately protect the rights of aliens. The Baroness
also drew up a draft declaration on the human rights of noncitizens.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., G.

(1983).
29. R.

GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

LILLICH, supra

note I, at 122.
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treats those persons residing within its borders. Yet states
do not always act contrary to the interests of aliens.
It is important to note that regional arrangements more
effectively protect aliens' rights than multilateral international agreements. Liflich surveys a number of European initiatives, which, he suggests, serve as models for protecting
aliens and contribute to the development of universal
norms. 30 He recognizes, however, that the one of the bestknown agreements, the European Convention on Establishment,3 1 restrains only slightly the state's powers found in
customary international law. The reason behind this arrangement's lack of force is that it is merely a codification of
existing practice rather than a progressive development in
the law governing aliens. Lillich shows that the European
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers 2 is
more progressive; it is concerned not only with employment
questions, but also generally with the protection of the status
of migrant workers. Since this initiative deals with all aspects
of a migrant worker's life, it is considered the high-water
mark in the migrant labor field.
Clearly aliens deserve protection. Defining standards
for such protection, however, is an empty exercise when segregated from what Lillich calls the "cut and thrust" of international relations. Norms defined in resolutions or declarations of international organizations are often denied legal effect. Sometimes states create these standards, animated by
political motives and divorced from law-generating intentions of creating law. Nations are wary of legal principles
and obligations that can eventually be used against themselves. Thus, to give legal effect to U.N. documents that are
30. Examined in the book are the free movement of workers provisions
of the European Economic Community, the European Convention on Establishment, the European Social Charter, and the European Migrant
Workers Convention. The book's fifth chapter concludes with an evaluation of the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights, including a discussion of cases about aliens that have come before the European
Commission on Human Rights. See id. at 94-103.
31. European Convention on Establishment, Dec. 13, 1955, 529
U.N.T.S. 141.
32. European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers,
Nov. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 93, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1381-90 (1977).
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not treaties overstates the sources of international law.33
The international legal scholar's task is to examine cases
where steps have actually been taken to protect aliens' rights,
and to determine what moves states from aspiration to implementation. How and why states assume legal obligations
toward aliens is a different question from whether such obligations should be assumed.
Towards the book's conclusion, Lillich moves from
describing the law to describing states' practice regarding
aliens. Here, he proves to be a sober observer. He admits
that the norms have generally been ineffective. The exceptions to this bleak picture are bilateral treaties and regional
arrangements. The experiences of the European Community and the Council of Europe, Lillich notes, may prove to
be profitable codification ventures, for they can serve as
models for similar agreements between other states, as well
as contribute to the development of universal norms.
The European Community's efforts demonstrate what is
possible in the realm of alien protection. No doubt aliens in
the European Community have state-created rights resulting
from states bargaining together, writing treaties, and providing procedures and a forum in which cases can be heard.
The foundation of the European Community's approach,
34
however, is treaty law.
The European experiment illustrates that states permit
aliens to protect their rights as individuals, without recourse
to their home states, which may or may not take up their
cause. It is uncertain what conditions make this type of
agreement possible. Perhaps the answer lies in the overwhelming need to create an economic union that diffuses
tensions between individuals and states, without also creating opportunities for "gunboat diplomacy" over affronts to
individuals.
Specific cases of protection raised by Lillich provide examples of agreements for state protection of aliens. For ex-

33. A fairly voluminous body of works exist on this subject. See, e.g.,
sources cited supra notes 4 & 10.

34. For Lillich's recitation of these treaties, see R. LILLICH, stipra note

I, at 81-103.
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ample, the French-Algerian repatriation agreements,3 5 which
include severance and payment clauses, may be regarded as
just. The agreements provide for the professional training,
or financing, of aliens who return to Algeria. In comparison,
other countries have yet to create legislation designed to retrain nationals who have become unemployed due to
changes in the economy. Regrettably, Lillich fails to explain
why France agreed to grant rights directly to aliens. Lillich
thereby misses an opportunity to provide readers with insights into France's motivations.
Glossing over these issues permits Lillich to describe in
detail the few cases in which he sees headway in the universalization and improvement of aliens' rights. Unfortunately,
he misses the crucial question of why states act as they do.
The book's underlying premise suggests the European system of protection reflects necessity. This premise is vague
and unsatisfying; it gives rise to a method of analysis that
fails to elucidate the conditions conducive to protecting
human rights.
Lillich suggests "the construction of a comprehensive
international human rights regime protecting aliens... is an
art as well as a science, in which the skills of imaginative advocates are as important as the work of enlightened draftsmen." 3 6 That Professor Lillich is both an imaginative advocate and an enlightened draftsman is familiar to all students
of international law. This book represents a superb compilation of cases and legislation concerned with aliens.
The discussion of historical development and doctrines
provides a helpful summary of the law protecting aliens. It is
up-to-date and includes contemporary instruments currently
under discussion. The appendices contain the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals
Who are not Citizens of the Country in Which They Live, the
text of articles of the Draft Declaration adopted by the openended working of the U.N. General Assembly, and the Draft
International Convention on the Protection for the Rights of
all Migrant Workers and their Families. Thus, scholars and
students will be saved hours of research in a U.N. repository.
35. For a text of the agreement, see Decree No. 80-1150 of Dec. 30,
1980, 1981 Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise 162.
36. R. LILLICH, supra note 1, at 98.
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But Professor Lillich wants the book to be more than a
mere compendium. He states "it is up to lawyers-especially
human rights lawyers, who have until now shown relatively
little interest in the law governing the treatment of aliensto assess, develop and establish the legal regimes under
which the rights of aliens may be more effectively protected.
It has been the purpose of this volume to assist them in that
grand endeavor."3 7 While embracing Lillich's exhortation to
act, human rights lawyers should also consider rejecting the
assumptions underlying his study. Effective human rights
law is created by those who understand the competing interests and values that continue to permeate the international
legal order, and who remain sensitive to its limits. Innovation and advancement in international human rights law can
best come from a willingness to acknowledge the "is," and
not just the "ought," of international law.
OWEN KUPFERSCHMID*
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